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ABSTRACT
We present a practical system for conducting sealed-bid auctions
that preserves the secrecy of the bids while providing for veriﬁ-
able correctness and trustworthiness of the auction. The auctioneer
must accept all bids submitted and follow the published rules of
the auction. No party receives any useful information about bids
before the auction closes and no bidder is able to change or repudi-
ate her1 bid. Our solution uses Paillier’s homomorphic encryption
scheme [25] for zero knowledge proofs of correctness. Only mini-
mal cryptographic technology is required of bidders; instead of em-
ploying complex interactive protocols or multi-party computation,
the single auctioneer computes optimal auction results and pub-
lishes proofs of the results’ correctness. Any party can check these
proofs of correctness via publicly veriﬁable computations on en-
crypted bids. The system is illustrated through application to ﬁrst-
price, uniform-price and second-price auctions, including multi-
item auctions. Our empirical results demonstrate the practicality
of our method: auctions with hundreds of bidders are within reach
of a single PC, while a modest distributed computing network can
accommodate auctions with thousands of bids.
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, auctions and electronic marketplaces have been
used to facilitate trillions of dollars in trade in the world econ-
omy [10]. Individual events, for instance, the procurement of truck-
load services by Proctor and Gamble, approach $1 billion in trans-
action value [32]. The eBay marketplace reported a record $44.3
billion volume in the 2005 calendar year, representing a 30% in-
creaseover2004. Governmentsworld-wideuseauctionstoallocate
property rights, including high proﬁle auctions for wireless spec-
trum [20] and licenses for new cars [2]. Previously used for rare
goods, or for time-sensitive goods (e.g., ﬂowers, ﬁsh), auctions can
now be harnessed for all kinds of commercial transactions [21]. In
a typical week in February, 2006, the U.S. treasury sells more than
1For clarity of reference, we use “she”, “her”, etc. to refer to the
bidders and veriﬁers, and “he”, “his”, etc. to refer to the auctioneer
(generally a prover), and other parties to the auction.
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$25 billion in three-month treasury bills.2 Most recently, spon-
sored search auctions have driven upwards of $1 billion in revenue
to Google in a single quarter.
Despite this success, there is increasing evidence that fraud is an
issue that can plague electronic auctions.3 Indeed, a number of au-
thors have argued that the reason that theoretically appealing auc-
tions such as Vickrey auctions are rare in practice is because of
the problem of fraud and untrustworthy auctioneers [31, 19]. Two
kinds of manipulations come to mind. The ﬁrst is an auctioneer that
deviates from the rules of an auction. This problem can be allevi-
ated at a cost in privacy by the public revelation and veriﬁcation of
all bids. Another more subtle and harder to prevent problem can
occur when an auctioneer is in collusion with some bidders, per-
haps conveying useful information about bids received during the
bidding process.
We have developed a practical protocol for sealed bid auctions that
prevents such manipulations. An important factor in its practicality
is having a clearly understandable and convincing solution acces-
sible to knowledgable people who are nevertheless not experts on
the intricacies of cryptography and general zero knowledge proofs.
To that end, we have carefully examined the role of all parties in a
sealed-bid auction and formalized their role in a cryptographically
sound protocol. We consider who among them needs to know what,
and when; based on that, we have constructed a protocol whose pri-
mary aim is not complete security, but rather practicality. We touch
on the real-world issues that arise in the actual implementation of
such a system. Our protocol provides clear proofs of correctness
that reveal minimal knowledge to the parties involved, yet is easily
implemented and requires no special technology on the part of the
bidders.
We assume only commodity computing resources and a public key
infrastructure under which the auctioneer, seller, bidders, and no-
taries all possess public/private key pairs for digital signatures. The
auctioneer holds a private key for bid encryptions and publishes an
appropriately certiﬁed public key. Bids are encrypted by bidders
using this public key, although encrypted bids are kept secret from
the auctioneer until an auction closes. The cryptographic methods
of homomorphic encryption [25] are used in providing veriﬁable
correctness and trustworthiness.
2Sold in Vickrey auctions. See
http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov
3The number of fraud complaints submitted to the FBI’s Internet
Crime Complaint Center rose from 16,775 in 2001 to 103,959 in
2004, and the percentage from auction fraud in particular rose from
42.8% to 71.2% over the same period.We thus present a framework for auctions that is both practical and
secrecy preserving, while providing for veriﬁably correct and trust-
worthy auctions. We focus on two aspects of practicality. First, the
auction must clear in reasonable time and with reasonable commu-
nication requirements, even for a large number of bidders. Second,
the computational architecture must be consistent with practical
business models. To achieve this we focus on proofs of correctness
rather than secure computation. Unlike previous solutions, e.g.,
Naor et al. [22], we require neither the existence of multiple auc-
tioneers nor that the auctioneers or bidders collaborate to conduct
the auction. We believe that a model involving a single auctioneer
that is solely responsible for conducting the auction and indepen-
dent veriﬁcation of the auction by third parties is more realistic
from a business perpective.
We preserve secrecy by keeping bid information secret from every-
one except the auctioneer, and keeping bid information secret even
from the auctioneer until the auction closes. The only information
revealed to the public is that implied by the outcome of the auction,
that is, that implied by the identity of the winner or the payment
made by the winner. A secrecy-preserving veriﬁcation protocol
allows anyone, including bidders and third parties, to verify that
the auction was correct: the auctioneer correctly determined the
winner(s) and associated payment(s) according to published rules.
Most importantly, trustworthiness is supported by carefully ensur-
ing that all bidders must follow through with information about
bids of pre-committed value and quantity after an auction closes,
and the auctioneer must accept and respect all bids in determining
the outcome.
In addition to a seller, multiple bidders, and an auctioneer, our
model assumes the following commercial entities: Notaries ensure
the security of an auction by acting as witnesses. Notaries witness
bid submission in order to protect a bidder against an auctioneer
who tries to ignore her bids. They may also be used to enforce
nonrepudiation of bids after the auction is closed. Delayed private
key revelation services are used to prevent a bidder from refusing
to respect commitments she has made during the auction protocol.
Our auction process ensures veriﬁable correctness and trustworthi-
ness. Although an auctioneer learns the values of bids submitted
after an auction closes, an auctioneer is not able to use this informa-
tion to change the outcome in the auction or provide an advantage
to any bidder. Thus, we prevent a “bad apple” within the auction-
eer’s organization from being able to proﬁtably leak information
during the course of an auction. On the other hand, and at a consid-
erable gain in simplicity, we have deliberately chosen not to pro-
tect against an auctioneer revealing bid values and quantities after
an auction has closed and the outcome has been announced. Our
design does not provide any algorithmic enforcement for this ad-
ditional privacy protection. Algorithmic and software methods are
available for solving this problem. But in our view they are too
cumbersome and hard to understand to ﬁnd wide business applica-
bility.4
In solving what we view as the ﬁrst-order problem of trustworthi-
ness during the execution of an auction, we choose to push these
secondary considerations into the realm of contractual obligations
4We also note that even when bid values stay concealed from the
auctioneer at great process complexity cost, a determined adversary
can try to spy and obtain information on a rival’s bid using corrupt
insiders. Thus, an absolute guarantee of secrecy is not attainable in
real life in any case.
and the auctioneer’s business reputation. An additional beneﬁt is
that this architecture will also allow for extensions to combinato-
rial auctions for which fully-private computational techniques can-
not scale.
Parenthetically, we observe that complete secrecy by the auctioneer
can be provided, in cases where it is deemed absolutely essential,
by appeal to hardware solutions. Trusted servers, with specially
designed hardware and software audited by third parties for cor-
rectness, and installed in physically secure locations with ongoing
monitoring and auditing, can prevent the leaking of information
with high assurance [33]. In fact, with such deliberately opaque
servers it is of the utmost import that an auction participant can in-
dependently verify the correctness of the outcome of an auction and
be assured that there is no fraud. Thus, such technological meth-
ods to eliminate secrecy leaks are very well complemented by our
methods for veriﬁable correctness.
To demonstrate the scalability of our technology, we have con-
ducted preliminary timing tests (Section 5). We show that for ac-
ceptable strength of the cryptographic security key, single or multi-
item auctions with 100 bidders can be prepared in around two hours
of computation and veriﬁed in less than half an hour, all on a stan-
dard (2.8 GHz Pentium 4) PC. We also show that the computations
scale linearly with the number of bidders. Because our method
is easily parallelizable, it is possible to accommodate even tens of
thousands of bidders in at most a day of computation on a 64-node
network.
1.1 Related Work
Much of the previous work on the use of cryptography for con-
ducting veriﬁably correct and trustworthy auctions has focused on
the goal of complete privacy [16, 22, 13]; see Brandt [5] for a re-
cent discussion. This is typically achieved through assuming two or
more trusted third parties, either with numerous auctioneers [13] or
with asymmetric models in which the commerical entity of an auc-
tion issuer is assumed in addition to the auctioneer [22, 18]. Some
protocols achieve this property through bidder-resolved multi-party
computation [5]. In comparison, we settle for veriﬁable correctness
and trustworthiness in combination with complete privacy to all
parties except the auctioneer; see also [11]. As discussed above, the
auctioneer cannot learnany information about bidsuntil the auction
has closed. In return we achieve a non-interactive5 protocol that is
especially simple from a bidder’s perspective. For trusted third par-
ties we require only notaries, who provide a lightweight “witness”
service and are independent business entities that already exist in
practice [34]. In the same spirit, whereas previous architectures
use cryptography for anonymity, we adopt business entities (e.g.,
notaries as proxy bidders) for this purpose. Note that achieving
information-theoretic guarantees on privacy is impossible in most
Vickrey auctions [6]. A single-item Vickrey auction, for example,
necessarily reveals the exact second place bid to the winner.
In addition to providing business realism (also see Lipmaa et
al. [18] for a critique of previously published methods), we choose
to adopt standard methods from homomorphic encryption com-
bined with test sets and eschew more complex cryptographic ideas
5Interactive cryptographic auction protocols require the active par-
ticipation of bidders throughout the auction process in order to ob-
tain the auction results, generally via multi-party computation or
related methods. Non-interactive protocols such as ours require no
such bidder participation; submission of bids is the only required
bidder activity.suchassecuremulti-partycomputation, obfuscationofcircuits, and
oblivious transfer. As Bradford et al. [4] argue, many such complex
protocols requiring the participation of bidders suffer from “proto-
col completion incentive problems”, in which bidders who know
they have lost or change their minds can disrupt the protocol and
prevent the completion of an auction. We intentionally avoid such
problems by having a single trusted party compute the outcome.
We share with Lipmaa et al. [18] (see also [1, 3, 5, 35, 36]) the use
of homomorphic encryption, but seek a simpler solution through
the use of a single auctioneer in place of the two server model
adopted in their work. In their protocol, the seller and an auction
authority, who are trusted not to collude, work interactively to gen-
erate zero-knowledge proofs of correctness. This results in stronger
privacy properties at the cost of this additional process complexity.
Our approach can be extended to secrecy-preserving multi-item
auctions (presented here) and combinatorial auctions (reserved for
future work). Speciﬁcally, our trusted auctioneer can apply fast al-
gorithms to the combinatorial optimization problem in determining
winners. The auctioneer must simply construct a proof that the out-
come is correct and need not involve multiple parties in computing
the outcome. Earlier work on multi-item auctions either assumes
distributedtrust[14, 36, 1], oradoptsmulti-partycomputationtech-
niques [5], and the current state of the art for secure combinatorial
auctions is still not very scalable [37, 35]. One practical issue, ad-
dressed in previous work but not here, is that of noncoercibility [7,
34] of an auction. Noncoercibility prevents a bidder from being
able to credibly claim to a third party that it bid in a particular way
after the close of an auction. Auctions with this property are resis-
tant to bidding rings, which depend on bidders proving that their
bid was submitted according to the rules of the bidding ring.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Desired Auction Properties
Based on the analysis in the introduction, we list desiderata for our
auction process.
• Non-repudiationbybidders: Onceabiddersubmitsabid, her
bid is provably unalterable. Moreover, a bidder is committed
to ﬁnally revealing her bid.
• Non-repudiation by auctioneer: The auctioneer’s exclusion
of a properly submitted bid can be conclusively proven and
thus becomes legally actionable.
• Trustworthiness: The auctioneer cannot know the bids until
after the close of the bid submission phase. Thus the auc-
tioneer cannot collude with bidders by sharing others’ bids
during the auction.
• Veriﬁable correctness: The public and bidders receive a
proof of which bids won, and (if applicable) a proof of the
correctness of their own payments. The auction protocol en-
forces correctness; an auctioneer will not be able to present
valid proofs for invalid winners or incorrect payments.
• Privacy: The bids are hidden to everyone until all bids are
committed. At the close of the auction, only the auction-
eer knows any private information. He may keep the out-
come private, notifying only winners, or make it public by
revealing some or all of the bids, items won by whom, and
payments. Revelation of these values does not reveal other
private information not implied by the values themselves.
In achieving these properties we make standard cryptographic as-
sumptions. For our homomorphic encryption, we make Paillier’s
“Composite Residuosity Assumption” (CRA) [25].6 CRA implies
that if the public key n is difﬁcult to factor, then it is also difﬁ-
cult to compute the nth root of a number x = rn (mod n2). This
assumption is related to the widely accepted RSA assumption un-
derlying the security of RSA encryption and is believed to be of
similar strength.7 We further assume that the cryptographic hash
function used for commitments preserves the security of the en-
crypted bids. See Section 2.4.2 for a detailed description of such
hash functions. Because the security of our encryption is related to
the computational complexity of solving these cryptographic prob-
lems, longercryptographickeysandmorecomplexhashalgorithms
can be adopted over time as computational hardware gets more
powerful. This will maintain the same level of realized security
at comparable computational running time.
2.2 Real-World Components
As usual, our auction system comprises an auctioneer AU, bidders
B = {B1,...,Bk}, and a seller. Bidders can also be proxies to pro-
vide anonymity. In addition, we assume a universally accessible,
tamper resistant clock (such as provided by the United States NIST
time servers) and the following two components:
2.2.1 Certiﬁed Bulletin Board
The auctioneer maintains a certiﬁed bulletin board. This can be a
publicly known website maintained and updated by the auctioneer.
The auctioneer uses the bulletin board to post all public informa-
tion about the auction, including the initial auction announcement
as well as (encrypted) information about bids that have been sub-
mitted and proofs that can be used to verify all publicly available
information about the outcome. All posts to the the bulletin board
will carry appropriate digital signatures.
2.2.2 Notaries
Notaries N = {N1,...,Nm} are reputable agents, such as law ﬁrms,
accountants, or ﬁrms specializing in providing a witness for bid-
ders. When preparing to participate in an auction, a bidder may
select a set of notaries of her choosing from some set of notaries
possibly authorized by the auctioneer.8 In using a notary, when-
ever a bidder sends bid information to the auctioneer she also sends
theinformationtoanynotariesshehasselected. Thesenotariesalso
submitthisinformationtotheauctioneer, andactaswitnessesinthe
case that a bidder notices that an auctioneer does not post correct
information to the bulletin board. We require that a majority of the
notaries is uncorruptible. Note that our process is structured so that
no information about the actual bids is revealed to the notaries, and
their only role is to serve as witnesses in case of a dispute between
a bidder and the auctioneer.
2.3 Overall Flow and Main Steps of Auction
Schematically, the auction process will proceed in three main
stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the auctioneer posts the auction announce-
ment on the bulletin board. The announcement, to be detailed later
6 A number x = rn (mod n2) is known as an nth residue mod n2.
Because n is a composite number — the product of two primes —
x is a composite residue.
7In the RSA problem, if x is an eth residue mod n, that is, x =
me (mod n), x is secure if n’s only two prime factors are unknown
and n is hard to factor.
8Whether or not the use of a notary is mandatory depends on de-
tails of how non-repudiation is achieved. See the discussion in Sec-
tion 3.1.on, includes a deadline time T for submitting bids. In the second
stage, the bidders commit to bids but post bid information in a form
that is hidden even to the auctioneer. Notaries are engaged in this
stage. In the ﬁnal stage, the bidders must follow through and re-
veal the encryptions of their bids to the auctioneer and the public.
The auctioneer and other bidders verify that these encrypted bids
are consistent with the posted commitments. The auctioneer then
decrypts the bids in secret, and performs computation to determine
the optimal outcome of the auction. The auctioneer then posts pub-
lic proofs that the selection of the winner(s) and their payments
was done according to the auction rules. After the last posting, any
party can verify the correctness of the outcome.
2.4 Cryptographic Tools
Our system relies on mathematically sound and widely accepted
cryptographic tools. We describe the tools we employ in our result,
referring to other publications for established results and providing
proofs for new uses of existing tools. We will sometimes refer to a
“prover” P and a “veriﬁer” V when discussing secrecy-preserving
proofs of mathematical facts relating to our auctions.
2.4.1 Public Key Infrastructure
We assume cryptographically sound methods of establishing and
exchanging public keys used for all the cryptographic tools we em-
ploy. Speciﬁcally, the auctioneer requires a public/private key pair
for Paillier encryption [25]. Public keys are used for encryption
and private keys for decryption. In addition, the auctioneer, no-
taries, and all bidders require public/private key pairs for digital
signatures. The public keys of all parties must be mutually known
and certiﬁed correct. We notate digital signatures as follows: AU
can sign message x, generating SignAU(x). A bidder Bi’s signature
of x is denoted Signi(x).
2.4.2 Commitments
Cryptographic commitments enable a party to commit to a partic-
ular value (such as a bid or number of items desired) without re-
vealing that value until later, and prevent the party from claiming
their value was anything other than the original value committed
to. Auction participants will, when so required, commit to data D
by applying a hash function H to data D then digitally signing that
hash value H(D). The hash function is required to be perfectly con-
cealing of all information about D, as well as collision resistant in
the sense that it is computationally intractable to ﬁnd two different
data values x and y such that H(x) = H(y). In practice, we can
employ a widely used hash function such as Whirlpool [28] or a
member of the SHA-2 [23] family, which are assumed to have the
required properties.
2.4.3 Sources of Randomness
Cryptographic key generation and probabilistic encryption require
a good source of random data. We postulate bidders’ and notaries’
ability to create enough highly random data to create strong key
pairs and encrypt or sign a small number of values. We further
postulate that the auctioneer has a source of random data sufﬁcient
to encrypt large numbers of integers used in the secrecy-preserving
proofs described below. Such a source might be hardware that ex-
tracts randomness from radio static or quantum noise in diodes.
Such “hardware randomness generators” are already in widespread
use in applied cryptography.
2.4.4 Delayed private key revelation
LetBidi denotethebidvalueofbidderBi. Weneedtoguardagainst
a bidder Bi, possibly in collusion with the auctioneer, refusing to
open her commitment and reveal her encrypted bid E(Bidi). One
approach to provide non-repudiation employs a delayed private key
revelation service, DPrKR. Such a service will at regular intervals
(sayeveryminute)postanewcryptographicpublickeyfollowedby
posting the associated private decryption key after a ﬁxed period of
time (say an hour later).9
Before time T of the close of the auction, each bidder Bi encrypts
Z = EDR(E(Bidi)) (where the bid is ﬁrst encypted with the public
key of the auctioneer), and posts Signi(Z) on the bulletin board us-
ing a DPrKR public encryption key DR whose decryption key will
be released after time T +1. After time T +1, the decryption key
DDR associated with DR will be posted by DPrKR. This method
will be used to allow the auctioneer (and everybody else) to de-
crypt Z = EDR(E(Bidi)) using DDR after time T +1 if the bidder
herself refuses, guaranteeing the auctioneer alone access to Bidi.
If so desired, several independent DPrKR services can be used for
combining encryptions.
2.4.5 Veriﬁable and Conﬁdential Comparisons
Paillier’s encryption scheme [25] enables integer values to be en-
crypted in such a way that it is possible to perform arithmetic oper-
ations on those values using only the encrypted data.10 We present
a technical exposition in Appendix A for the interested reader.
Paillier’s is a homomorphic encryption system, in which the result
of an operation applied to two ciphertexts is a valid encryption of
an operation (possibly the same one) applied to their plaintexts.11
In cryptography, a plaintext is the original form of a message, in
our case the integer representing a bid or quantity; a ciphertext is
the encryption of a plaintext. Homomorphic encryption schemes
enable computation over the hidden values without revealing ei-
ther the values themselves or the results of the computation with-
out proper decryption. Paillier’s system employs a public/private
key pair, n and φ respectively. The private key n is the product
of two large prime numbers p and q, and its size is determined
by the security requirements of the application. A 1024-bit pub-
lic encryption key is widely considered sufﬁcient for security until
2010 [12]. Paillier encryption is also a “probabilistic encryption”
scheme. Encryptions are performed with a random “help value”
r that is used to achieve semantic security: given two plaintexts
and two encryptions of them, one cannot tell which ciphertext cor-
responds to which plaintext without being able to decrypt them.
Semantic security is critical for our test set mechanism to preserve
the secrecy of the bids.
The encryption of a message x will typically be denoted E(x,r),
where the public key n is implicit and the help value r is made
explicit. In discussion below, the help value r will sometimes be
omitted to simplify notation where it is implicit or irrelevant, for
example, C = E(x).
9Rivest et al. [30] also provide a method for cryptography with
forced time release where the user sends x to a time-released cryp-
tography service which sends Es(x) using a secret key s to be re-
leased later on. Thus, in their solution the service knows the secret.
10Paillier proves the security of his scheme under the “composite
residuosity assumption”, the assumption of the computational in-
feasability of solving a number theoretic problem similar in difﬁ-
culty to the assumptions underlying the security of other cryptosys-
tems such as RSA [29], ElGamal [9], and Rabin [27] encryption.
11More formally, in a homomorphic encryption scheme, there exist
operations ⊕ and ⊗ such that given ciphertexts C1 = E(x1) and
C2 = E(x2), C1⊗C2 = E(x1⊕x2). Paillier’s encryption scheme is
doubly homomorphic. See Appendix A.We present here a summary of the properties of, and extensions to,
Paillier’s scheme we use in this paper. First, given only the en-
cryption E(x1) and either another encryption E(x2) or a constant
k, anyone can compute the encryptions E(x1 +x2), E(x1 +k), and
E(x1 ·k) without learning anything about x1, x2, or n. Second,
based on these properties and the following Range-of-Values tests,
we can also prove a full set of inequality operations for two en-
crypted values E(x1) and E(x2), e.g., x1 = x2, x1 > x2, etc., again,
without revealing anything about x1 or x2. It is also possible to
compare encrypted bids to constants in a similar way. We employ
the notation E(x)E(y) to mean “x ≤ y can be proven using en-
crypted values E(x) and E(y)” and the similar notation  (≥), 
(<), and  (>). The veriﬁcation of these comparisons is detailed
in Appendix A.4.
2.4.6 Veriﬁable, Conﬁdential Range-of-Values Tests
Given ciphertextC = E(x,r) we need to prove that x < 2t for some
t such that 2t < n/2. That is, we we want to be able to verify
that a bid Bidi is smaller than some agreed upon bound 2t, without
revealing any information about Bidi. The value oft determines the
number of bits of resolution available to bidders in seelcting their
bids. For our purposes it sufﬁces to take t = 34, so that if bids are
in units of one thousand dollars, for example, then bids are limited
to at most $16 trillion.
This primitive is essential for proving inequalities. Because some
of our mathematical operations are over the integers modulo n (Zn),
a small negative number is the same as a large positive number,
and vice versa. For example, 13 ≡ −2 (mod 15). To prove for two
values a and b that a ≥ b, we ﬁrst show that a,b < n/2 and then
that a−b < n/2. This works because if a and b are less than n/2
and a is greater than b, then clearly a−b < n/2, and if a is less
than b, then a−b will “wrap around” modulo n and must be a large
number, that is, a < b → a−b (mod n) > n/2. The formal details
of this are found in Appendix A.4.
We perform the test as follows:
DEFINITION 1. A valid test set TS for the assertion “C =
E(x,r) is an encryption of a number x < 2t < n/2” is a set of 2t
encryptions:
TS = {G1 = E(u1,s1),...,G2t = E(u2t,s2t)} (1)
where each of the powers of 2: 1,2,...,2t−1 appears among the ui
exactly once and the remaining t values uj are all 0.
By use of a test set TS, the prover P can prove that x < 2t < n as
follows:
Range Protocol. Let x = 2t1 +...+2t` be the representation of
m, a sum of distinct powers of 2. AU selects from TS the en-
cryptions Gj1,...,Gj` of 2t1,...,2t`, and further t −` encryptions
Gj`+1,...,Gjt of 0. Note that:

E(x,r)−1·Gj1 ·...·Gjt

(mod n2) = E(0,s) (2)
is an encryption of 0 with help value s =  
r−1·sj1 ·...·sjt

(mod n) if and only if indeed x = 2t1 +...+2t`
and the Gjh were chosen as stated. Now since AU has the decryp-
tion key φ and thus knows the help value r, then he can hand over
to V the set {Gj1,...,Gjt} and the above help value s. V can now
verify on her own that (2) holds and deduce that x < 2t < n/2.
The above protocol reveals nothing to V beyond x < 2t < n/2, be-
cause TS is a set, in actual implementation a randomly permuted
array of the elements in question. Consequently V has no infor-
mation about which encryptions of powers of 2 are included in
{Gj1,...,Gjt} Furthermore, the inclusions of t −` encryptions of
0 hides even the number of non-zero bits in the binary representa-
tion of m. Finally, the inclusion of random factors sj1,...,sjt in the
computation of the help value s completely masks any information
about the help value r in the encryption E(x,r). Consequently no
information about x is revealed.
There is, however, a problem with the above protocol in that V
does not know that AU has presented her with a true test set. This is
overcome as follows. For ease of understanding we ﬁrst describe an
interactive veriﬁcation protocol, then modify it for non-interactive
use. The idea is to use a “cut and choose” procedure in which the
prover commits to a number of test sets and allows the veriﬁer to
choose and inspect multiple test sets and make sure that they are
each valid. Finally, the remaining test sets are all used to complete
the proof. An early, possibly the ﬁrst, use of this idea was presented
by Rabin [26].
Tamper Proof Interactive Veriﬁcation of x < 2t < n/2. First,
the prover P creates 2v, say for v = 20, test sets TS1,...,TS2v,
and presents those to V claiming that they are all valid. Veriﬁer
V randomly selects v test sets TSi1,...,TSiv and requests that P
reveal all the encryptions by revealing all the corresponding help
values. V veriﬁes all the encryptions and checks that every TSih is
valid. If any veriﬁcation fails, the process is aborted. Otherwise,
there now remain v unexamined test sets, call them TSj1,...,TSjv.
P now completes v repetitions of the above Range Protocol, and
establishes that x <2t <n/2 by use of each of the above remaining
v test sets. If all veriﬁcations succeed then V accepts that indeed
x < 2t < n/2.
The only way that P can cheat is if all the above remaining v test
sets are invalid, which requires that initially the 2v test sets com-
prised v proper test sets and v improper ones and, furthermore,
when examining the test sets, V randomly chose all the v proper
ones. The probability of such an unfortuitous choice is
 2v
v
−1
. In
our example of v = 20, that probability is, by Sterling’s Theorem,
about
q
20π
240 < 8
1012. Thus, we have a zero-knowledge protocol for
V to verify interactively with AU that x < 2t < n/2, when given a
ciphertext E(x,r) such that the inequality actually holds.
Tamper Proof Non-Interactive Veriﬁcation of x < 2t < n/2. We
prefer to adopt the following non-interactive method to establish
the validity of test sets in our scheme. In what follows, we adopt
the auctioneer AU as the prover. Suppose that there are (as in Sec-
tion 3.2) 2k range-of-values tests to perform. On closing the auc-
tion but before receiving information about bids, AU posts 4kv test
sets on the bulletin board. (For expository convenience, we proceed
below with our assumption of v = 20.)
Prior to closing, each bidder, the seller (if desired), and the auction-
eer are also asked to commit to a random string of length M bits,
which will be revealed after the auction closes and after the auc-
tioneer commits to test sets. Given strings Si from each bidder, SS
from the seller, and SAu from the auctioneer, the strings are XORed
together to generate X = S1 ⊕S2 ⊕···⊕Sk ⊕SS ⊕SAU. Note that
even if only one of the participants chooses his string randomly and
independently, then X is a truly random string.The 80k test sets posted on the Bulletin Board are then segmented
into 2k groups of 40 test sets each, i.e., the ﬁrst 40 test sets, the next
40 test sets, etc. The random bit-string X is then used, in combina-
tion with a ﬁxed rule available to all participants and posted at the
start of the auction to the bulletin board, to select 20 test sets from
each group. This random selection replaces the random selection
by the veriﬁer V employed in the interactive proof and allows the
prooftoworkwithoutinteraction. InAppendixBweofferanaccel-
erated version of this non-interactive veriﬁcation, that we refer to
as bulk veriﬁcation. Bulk veriﬁcation veriﬁes all the test sets used
in the auction en masse and economizes on the number of random
sets that must be checked.
Damg˚ ard et al. [8] and Lipmaa et al. [18] present other solutions
for proving an encrypted value is within a particular range.
3. SINGLE-ITEM AUCTIONS
Given the above cryptographic tools, we can formulate a single-
item auction succinctly. We assume that the bidders B1,...,Bk are
known entities with publicly known digital signatures Signi. We
further assume that the winner and her payment depend only on
the ordering of the bids and that the payment is one of the bids.
This class of auctions include ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions,
and also allows for auctions with reservation prices by a simple
extension in which the seller also submits a bid [15].
3.1 Protocol
Step 1. AU posts the following information on the bulletin board:
the terms of the auction specifying the item, the mechanism for
selection of the winner, the deadline T, an identiﬁer ID of the auc-
tion, and a Paillier encryption key n. AU knows the corresponding
decryption key φ. The auctioneer also posts information about the
notaries that are to be used for the auction. He posts the crypto-
graphic hash function H to be used by all participants in construct-
ing their commitments. Finally, the auctioneer deﬁnes the method
that will be used for extracting a random permutation of test set in-
dices from a random string to be used when proving the correctness
of the auction.12
We emphasize that all of the above data DAU is posted on the bul-
letin board, accompanied by AU’s signature SignAU(DAU).
Step 2. Every Bi chooses a bid Bidi. She encrypts it as Ci =
E(Bidi,ri) using the public key n and a randomly chosen help value
ri. In order to create efﬁcient test sets to prove bid sizes, we re-
strict the size of the bid so that Bidi < 2t < n/2 for small t, say,
t = 34. Every Bi also generates a random bit string Si of length
M which is used in the proof. Bidder Bi then commits to Ci and
Si by using the hash function, to form a single commitment string
Comi = [H(Ci),H(Si),ID], which also includes the identiﬁer ID of
the auction. Finally, the bidder signs this commitment, and sends
Signi(Comi) to AU and her notaries, if used, before time T. AU
returns a signed receipt Ri = SignAU([Comi,ID,T]).
Note that hiding of the encrypted bids and of the random strings
by use of the hash function H prevents anyone from gaining any
knowledge of the data prior to time T. In particular, neither the
notaries nor the auctioneer have any meaningful information.
12We recall the random strings Si XORed together to yield the auc-
tion random data X. AU must specify here the method used to
extract a permutation of test sets from X before AU sees X so that
everyone knows AU is revealing a truly random selection of test
sets.
Step 3. At time T, the AU posts all the received commitments
Com1,...,Comk on the bulletin board, as well as a random bit
string SAU of length M. AU also creates a number of test sets
TS1,TS2,...,TSK, where K is a multiple of k, e.g., K = 80k. He
signs and posts the test sets on the bulletin board.
Step 4. Between time T and T +1 any Bidder Bi who has a re-
ceipt Ri for a bid which is not posted, can appeal her non-inclusion,
resorting to her notaries if she has used them.
Step 5. After time T +1, every Bi sends to AU her encrypted bid
Ci = E(Bidi,ri) as well as her random string Si. After time T +1,
AU posts the encrypted bids, C1,...,Ck, and the random strings,
S1,...,Sk, on the bulletin board. Every Bidder Bi can verify, for any
bidder Bj, that the posted value Comj corresponds to the ciphertext
Cj and the random data string Sj. In case of discrepancies she
protests. ThischeckcanbeperformedsimplybycomputingH(Cj),
H(Sj), and checking the digital signature Signj(H(Cj),H(Sj),ID).
To discourage AU from decrypting and observing some bids after
time T and sending instructions to a favored bidder (for instance,
instructing the bidder not to unlock her bid), we summarize two
solutions. First, bidders who get such a warning and consequently
refuse to unlock their bids before time T +1 could be obligated
to pay a large ﬁne to a disinterested third party, such as one of
the notaries in the auction. Thus, with this view the notaries not
only act on behalf of a bidder in providing a witness to ensure that
their own bids are respected by the auctioneer, but notaries also act
on behalf of a bidder in ensuring that other bidders must follow
through and reveal bids to which they had earlier committed.13
Our preferred method (due to its simplicity) is to use delayed de-
cryption key revelation services, DPrKR. For this, bidders must
submit encryptions of their encrypted bids EDR(Ci) before time
T +1 to be decrypted at time T +1. AU posts these on the bul-
letin board before time T +1, and at time T +1 both AU and ver-
iﬁers can open them simultaneously to recover the encrypted bids
Ci. Incidentally, a completely trustworthy DPrKR service could
even be used from the beginning of the auction, obviating the need
for cryptographic commitments.
Step 6. Using the decryption key φ, AU recovers the bids
Bid1,...,Bidk. The auctioneer then computes the winner of the
auction and the payment according to the auction rules. The auc-
tioneerpoststhewinner’sidentity, Bi andtheninformationtodeﬁne
the payment to be made by the winner to the bulletin board. This
information about payment can be posted in an encrypted form if
the payment is to be kept private from nonwinning bidders. Fi-
nally, and most importantly, the auctioneer also posts information
that will enable any party to verify that the correct result was im-
plemented. These include proofs of the correctness of the winner
and payment, and proofs of the validity of each bid.
3.2 Veriﬁcation
We now show how any veriﬁer V (including any of the bidders) can
verify on her own that the winner and payment of the auction were
determined according to the rules of the auction. This will be done
13If ﬁnes are used to enforce nonrepudiation, then notaries must be
mandatory for all bidders, and ﬁnes must go to the notaries, or to
another designated party other than the auctioneer or seller. This is
becauseiftheauctioneerweretoreceivetheproceedsofsuchaﬁne,
such a ﬁne would be meaningless as a deterrent to the auctioneer’s
collusion with a bidder.in a “zero knowledge” fashion, that is, without revealing anything
about the value of any bid except that implied by the outcome of
the auction. In addition, the auctioneer can choose how much of
the outcome is revealed. For example, the proof can validate that an
encrypted payment was correctly determined but without revealing
any information about the value of the payment.
The class of single-item auctions under consideration (including
ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions) has the property that the win-
ner and payment depend only on the ordering of the bids. In the
case of a second price (or Vickrey) auction, the item is sold to the
highest bidder but for the second highest price. This auction has
useful theoretical properties: it is a dominant strategy for bidders
to report their true willingness to pay, the auction is efﬁcient, and
Vickrey auctions with reservation prices14 are revenue maximizing
in symmetric environments when the auctioneer has the same prior
information about the value of each bidder before the auction [15].
In the case of a ﬁrst-price auction, the item is sold to the highest
bidder for the highest price.
Take as an example the Vickrey auction and assume, without loss of
generality, that AU announces that B1 is the winning bidder, which
is tantamount to the following set of claims:
{Bid1 > Bid2; Bid2 ≥ Bid3; ...;Bid2 ≥ Bidk} (3)
Note that the encrypted values
{C1,...,Ck} = {E(Bid1,r1),...,E(Bidk,rk)}, (4)
were posted in Step 5 of the protocol. To prove the claims, it suf-
ﬁces to show that eachCi is an encryption of a valid bid 0≤Bidi <
2t < n/2 for all i, and that
{C1C2,C2C3,...,C2Ck} (5)
Veriﬁer V veriﬁes these 2k−1 claims in a zero knowledge fash-
ion using the tools described above, which enables veriﬁcation of
the winner, item allocation, and payment as described in the next
paragraphs.
Recall that the auctioneer had posted 2k groups of 40 test sets in
Step 3. He creates proofs for each of the ﬁrst k claims using k
of these groups of 40 test sets, one for each claim. He reveals
all encryptions for the subgroup of 20 test sets determined by the
random string X and the random method posted in Step 1 of the
auction. With each of the 20 other test sets AU performs the com-
putation described in Section 2.4.6 (Range Protocol) and posts it
on the bulletin board. V can verify that all the revealed test sets are
valid, that their indices were chosen correctly, and that the k posted
computations are of the form (2). This veriﬁes the ﬁrst k claims. In
addition, AU posts proofs for the k−1 claims that Bid1 >Bid2 and
Bid2 ≥ Bidi,2 < i ≤ k by using k−1 groups of 40 additional test
sets for each inequality using the methods described in Section A.4.
This ordering of bids is used to veriﬁer the winner as the bidder
with identity corresponding to submitted bid E(Bid1), and the item
14In a Vickrey auction with a reservation price, in addition to bids
Bid1,...,Bidk there is a price rps from the seller. This is handled
just as a bid within the auction. The item is sold to the highest
bidder if the maximal bid is at least rpi but goes unsold other-
wise. (Think of this as “selling back to the seller”.) When sold,
the payment is the maximal value of the second highest bid and
the reservation price. Note that because the seller must commit to
her reservation price just like any other bidder there is no danger of
shill bidding.
is allocated to this bidder. In a Vickrey auction, the payment to be
made by the winner is Bid2 and this can be proved by sending a
veriﬁer V the random help value r2 from B2’s encrypted bid C2 =
E(Bid2,r2). V can then verify the correctness of its payment by
re-encrypting Bid2 with r2 and checking the result is C2.
4. MULTI-ITEM AUCTIONS
Consider now auctions for multiple identical items. In these auc-
tions, the auctioneer has some number l of available identical items
for sale. Real-life examples include large lots of refurbished items
on eBay, or U.S. Treasury bills. As before, we will be able to im-
plement a general class of auctions that includes the ﬁrst-price,
uniform-price, and second-price (generalized Vickrey) auctions.
We choose to illustrate the framework for divisible bids, in which
bidders are willing to accept any number of items up to a maximal
limit and bid a price per item. We also assume that no winning bids
are equal. However, there is nothing about the framework that is
limited in this way, and a treatment of tied bids and extensions to
“all-or-nothing” bids and “bid curves” will be described in future
work.
4.1 Protocol
Step 1. AU posts the auction information on the bulletin board as
in Section 3.1. In addition, AU posts the total number of items
available, l, and the maximum allocation to any one bidder (if any),
lmax.
Step 2. Each participating bidder Bi prepares two integer values
(Bidi,Qtyi) for each bid she wishes to submit to the auction, where
Bidi is the amount that she will pay per item and Qtyi is the maxi-
mum number of items desired by Bi. As above, Bi also generates a
random bit string Si and sends it to AU. Bi then encrypts Bidi and
Qtyi, using AU’s public Paillier key n, as E(Bidi) and E(Qtyi) and
commits by sending AU and her notaries, if used, commitments
Comi = [H(E(Bidi)),H(E(Qtyi)),H(Si),ID], (6)
and digital signature Signi(Comi). AU issues a receipt for these
commitments and publishes them on the bulletin board in accor-
dance with our standard protocol.
Step 3. As above, at time T AU posts received commitments, his
random string SAU, and test sets on the bulletin board. The number
of test sets will depend on the type of the auction and the payment
calculation; these numbers are detailed in Section 5.
Step 4. As above, bidders have between time T and T +1 to appeal
non-inclusion, which may involve resorting to the commitments
sent to any notaries.
Step 5. As above, bidders reveal their encrypted bids and quanti-
ties E(Bidi) and E(Qtyi), as well as their strings Si, between time
T and T +1, which AU publishes on the bulletin board. All bidders
can check that the revealed values correspond with earlier commit-
ments.
Step 6. AU privately recovers bids Bidi and quantities Qtyi using
private key φ, and uses the information to compute the correct out-
come of the auction. An important notion in a multi-item auction
is that of the threshold bid index, α. This is deﬁned such that bid-
ders Bα,...,Bk do not receive any items. The sum of the quantities
associated with winning bids Bid1,...,Bidα−1 is greater than or
equal to the number of available items l, and this is not true for a
smaller threshold index. Thus all bidders Bi, such that i < α, arewinners. The threshold winner α −1 may receive some subset of
her total demand. Formally, threshold index α is deﬁned so that:
"
α−2
∑
i=1
Qtyi < l
#
∧
"
α−1
∑
i=1
Qtyi ≥ l
#
(7)
Note that we have assumed here that there are enough bidders to
cover all of the supply. This can be handled without loss of gener-
ality, by also introducing a single dummy bid at zero price for all
supply, l. In addition to determining α, and thus the winners in the
auction, AU also posts proofs of the identity of the winner(s) and
their allocations on the bulletin board, as well as proofs of the va-
lidity of each bidder’s bid and quantity. He also computes proofs of
correctness of each winner Bi’s payment. If public veriﬁcation of
payments is required, AU posts these correctness proofs on the bul-
letin board, along with the random help values needed to decrypt
the payments. If the payments are to remain secret, he publishes
the proofs on the bulletin board but sends the random help values
privately to each winner.
4.2 Veriﬁcation
The veriﬁcation step in a multi-item auction is more complex than
for the single item auction, but relies largely on the same crypto-
graphic primitives used in the simpler single-item case. Each ver-
iﬁcation can be done in a zero knowledge fashion, revealing no
information beyond that implied by the outcome of the auction.15
As before, AU ﬁrst publicly proves the minimum bid-ordering in-
formation, that all winning bids are strictly greater than the thresh-
old bid Bidα, i.e., Bidi > Bidα−1 for all i < α −1 and Bidα−1 >
Bidj for all j ≥ α. This reveals only minimum public information
about the value of the bids; the same information that is implied
by the outcome. AU will also prove that the bid values are valid
and without wraparound. (See Section 2.4.6 for an explanation of
wraparound.)
In addition, AU must also prove that the quantities of the items
were encrypted correctly, i.e., without wraparound. We assume that
l < 2t < n/2 for number of available items l and test set size pa-
rameter t. AU ﬁrst proves that no bidder has submitted a quantity
greater than a speciﬁed maximum allowed allocation lmax ≤ l. To
do this, AU ﬁrst encrypts E(l,1) and E(lmax,1); a random help
value 1 is used so that anyone can verify those encryptions. AU
thenprovesE(Qtyi)E(lmax,1)forall1≤i≤k. Next, AU canuse
encryptions of various sums of quantities to prove the correctness
of the threshold bid index α. Paillier’s homomorphic encryption
system allows for a zero-knowledge proof that a ciphertext repre-
sents the encrypted value of the sum of two encrypted values; in
particular, ∏
α−2
i=1 E(Qtyi) = E(∑
α−2
i=1 Qtyi). Given this, AU can es-
tablish Eq. 7 over the encrypted quantities:
"
E(
α−2
∑
i=1
Qtyi)E(l)
#
∧
"
E(
α−1
∑
i=1
Qtyi)E(l)
#
(8)
4.2.1 Payment
In a ﬁrst-price auction, the auctioneer can prove a payment to a
third party by revealing the random help value used to encrypt win-
15 In the method presented, the veriﬁer V learns the number of bids
required to compute a Vickrey payment in the marginal economy
E(B−i). We can get around this through using multiple “thresh-
olds” and zero allocations; we reserve a full discussion of this detail
for future work.
ner B1’s bid, and optionally the value Bid1 itself. A veriﬁer can
simply check that the bid value corresponds with the encrypted
value submitted by the bidder. Similarly, in a uniform-price auc-
tion, whereby every bidder pays the bid price of the losing thresh-
old bidder Bα−1, then AU can provide a public proof by revealing
Bidα−1 via the help value used by Bα−1. The uniform price auc-
tion is an approximation to a Vickrey auction in this setting.16
We turn our attention to proving the correctness of prices in a gen-
eralized Vickrey auction, or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism for this multi-item setting [15]. In a VCG mechanism the
number of items are allocated according to the price bid but the ac-
tual payment for each winner depends on others’ bids. The Vickrey
payment for bidder Bi is deﬁned as:
pvcg,i = Qty∗
i ·Bidi−[V(B)−V(B−i)], (9)
where V(B) is the total revenue in the auction with all bidders,
V(B−i) is the total revenue in the marginal economy with bidder
Bi removed, and Qty∗
i denotes the quantity allocated to bidder i in
the auction. This has a simple interpretation: a bidder’s payment is
determined as the greatest amount other (displaced) bidders would
have paid for the same items had Bi not been participating in the
auction.
We require a proof to establish the correctness of this payment. Let
Qty−i
j denote the quantity awarded to bidder Bj in the marginal
auction without bidder Bi. For a non-marginal winner, i.e., i <
α −1, her VCG payment is:
Qty∗
i ·Bidi−
"
Qty∗
i ·Bidi+ ∑
j6=i,j≤α−1
Qty∗
j ·Bidj
#
+ ∑
j6=i,j≤βi−1
Qty−i
j ·Bidj =
"
∑
α−1<j≤βi−1
Qty−i
j ·Bidj
#
+[Qty−i
α−1·Bidα−1−Qty∗
α−1·Bidα−1] (10)
For the marginal winner, i = α −1, her VCG payment is:
Qty∗
i ·Bidi−[Qty∗
i ·Bidi+ ∑
j6=i,j<α−1
Qty∗
j ·Bidj]
+ ∑
j6=i,j≤βi−1
Qty−i
j ·Bidj = ∑
α−1<j≤βi−1
Qty−i
j ·Bidj (11)
Thus, the VCG payment by bidder Bi is a linear combination of the
product of the bid price and allocated quantity to bidders displaced
by bidder Bi from the winning allocation. In the case of a non-
marginal bidder, this computation also accounts for the effect on
the allocation to bidder α −1.
Consider the following veriﬁable proof structure for the term
∑α−1<j≤βi−1Qty−i
j ·Bidj that is common to both kinds of win-
ners:
Step 1. In generating the proof, AU must ﬁrst establish a bid or-
dering for the marginal auction without Bi, i.e., prove that βi is
the correct threshold bid index by showing Bidj > Bidβi−1 for
16It generates the same payment as in the Vickrey auction to win-
ning bidders i < α −1, as long as the threshold bidder has enough
spare demand to cover the allocated capacity of any winner. The
payment by the threshold winner Bα−1 is always larger than in the
Vickrey scheme, though.j 6= i, j < βi −1 and Bidβi−1 > Bidj for j ≥ βi, this can be done
as in the main auction. Second, AU must prove that bidder βi −1
is the threshold winner in this auction, by proving the analogue to
Eq. 7. Third, AU must publish encrypted values Payj =Qtyj·Bidj
for all j > αi, j < βi −1 (and similarly for the new marginal bid-
der, Payβi−1 = Qty−i
βi−1·Bidβi−1), and prove the correctness of all
of these ciphertexts. This requires proofs of correct multiplica-
tion, as described in Appendix A. The proof of Payβi−1 in turn
requires a proof of the quantity allocated Qty−i
βi−1 to this bidder,
via a proof that a published ciphertext is the encrypted value of
l−∑j6=i,j<βi−1Qtyj. Fourth, AU must publish the encrypted value
of the sum of these payments and a proof of its correctness.
Step 2. A veriﬁer V can independently compute the encrypted
Vickrey payment as above and check the correctness of the proof.
Step3. AU revealstherandomhelpvalueintheresultingencrypted
Vickrey payment to V, who decrypts using that value and veriﬁes it
is correct by re-encryption.
The veriﬁer V now knows that Bi’s Vickrey payment is correct
knowing nothing more about any bidder’s bid value than can be
derived from the deﬁnition of Vickrey payments.17
The additional term, [Qty−i
α−1·Bidα−1−Qty∗
α−1·Bidα−1] can be
determined in the case that bidder i is the threshold winner and
i = α −1 in an analogous fashion. Encrypted values of the alloca-
tion quantities received by bidder i in the main auction and in the
marginal auction, i.e., Qty∗
α−1 and Qty−i
α−1 can be established via
subtraction from total items l of the total allocation to other bid-
ders. Then, a ciphertext for the difference, Qty−i
α−1−Qty∗
α−1, and
then the product (Qty−i
α−1−Qty∗
α−1)Bidα−1 can be published and
proved.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We implemented Paillier encryption and test set veriﬁcation in C++
using the LiDIA number theory package [17] on a commodity
Linux workstation with a Pentium 4 2.8 GHz processor.
The greatest computational cost in our protocol is the construction
and veriﬁcation of test sets, and in particular the exponentiation of
random help values (rn) required to encrypt or (veriﬁably) decrypt
a value. This preparation cost dominates all other computation; for
example, to sort one million random 64-bit bids takes less than one
second on our system. In a single-item auction, the auctioneer can
prepare for an auction of 100 bidders in about two hours, and each
veriﬁer can independently verify the auctioneer’s proofs of correct-
ness in less than half an hour. Both preparation and veriﬁcation
scale linearly and are easily parallelized. Thus, with modest dis-
tributed computation, even a multi-item auction with ten thousand
bidders can be prepared in a few hours and veriﬁed in reasonable
time.
We present data for both 1024- and 2048-bit symmetric public en-
cryption keys, which are considered safe until 2010 and 2030, re-
spectively [12]. Because the lifetime of a security key is based
on the difﬁculty of breaking it on available computing power, we
claim that, for the most part, an auction with “5-year” security at
any point in time will take about the same amount of time as it does
17See Footnote 15.
today, as improvements in computing power for breaking keys are
likely to be comparable to those in encryption.18
Table 1 shows the time it takes to compute various cryptographic
operations on our test machine. We observe that the time required
to prepare or verify a test set is essentially that required by the en-
cryption and decryption. All test sets represent 234 discrete values.
Table 1: Time to perform basic operations
Operation Time (s.) Time (s.)
(1024-bit) (2048-bit)
Computation of rn 0.045 0.287
Encryption 0.045 0.287
Decryption with r 0.045 0.287
Decryption with φ 0.014 0.089
Decryption with rn 0.000 0.001
Constructing a TS 3.01 19.32
Verifying a TS 3.00 19.30
Proving 0 ≤ x < 2t given TS 0.001 0.001
Verifying proof of 0 ≤ x < 2t 0.070 0.41
For a single item auction of k bidders, the auctioneer must produce
k proofs of valid bids (i.e. Bidi < 2t for small t; we use 34), and
k−1 proofs of comparisons to prove the ordering of the outcome.
Using the bulk veriﬁcation method suggested in Appendix B, such
an auction requires 10·(2k−1) test sets, plus 25% for the test sets
that will be revealed to prove the test sets are valid. This gives us
an upper bound of 25k test sets required to conduct a trustworthy
single-item auction.
For a multi-item auction with payments based on one bid (e.g. ﬁrst-
price or second-price), we need only add to the above k proofs
Qtyi < 2t, k comparisons Qtyi < lmax, and 2 comparisons to prove
Equation 7. This means we need about double the number of test
sets, 4k+1, to conduct such a multi-item auction; about 50k test
sets are needed for trustworthiness. We list the time taken to pre-
pare these test sets and correctness proofs in Table 2.
Table 2: Time to prepare and verify auctions
Operation Number of Bids
100 1000 10000
Single-item Auctions
Preparation (1024-bit) 2.1 hr 21 hr 8.7 days
Veriﬁcation (1024-bit) 25 min 4.2 hr 42 hr
Preparation (2048-bit) 13.4 hr 5.6 days 56 days
Veriﬁcation (2048-bit) 2.7 hr 27 hr 11 days
Multi-item Auctions
Preparation (1024-bit) 4.2 hr 42 hr 17.5 days
Veriﬁcation (1024-bit) 52 min 8.7 hr 3.6 days
Preparation (2048-bit) 27 hr 11.2 days 112 days
Veriﬁcation (2048-bit) 5.4 hr 54 hr 22 days
For veriﬁed VCG payments in multi-item auctions (Section 4.2.1),
we also require proofs of multiplications for at most 2k+1 prod-
ucts, namely, ≤k proofs of the products Qtyi·Bidi and k+1 proofs
of the products of the partial allocation to the threshold bidder for
the main economy E(B) and up to k marginal economies (that is,
18Of course, if efﬁcient algorithms to solve the composite residu-
osity problem or factor large composites are discovered, our claim
does not hold.excluding bidder Bi) E(B−i). Each proof of a product requires 4 ex-
ponentiations for creating the MTS (“multiplication test set”) and
6 exponentiations to verify it. To achieve a reasonably small prob-
ability of error, we need to repeat the multiplication proof 80 times
(3
4
80
≈ 10−10). Thus each proof requires 320 exponentiations to
create and 480 to verify. Table 3 shows time required, again on
a P4 2.8 GHz processor, to verify Vickrey payments in the worst
case for various sizes of multi-item auctions. These computations
are required in addition to the above computations for verifying
prices and quantities.
Table 3: Veriﬁcation of Vickrey payments for multi-item auc-
tions
Operation Number of Bids
100 1000 10000
Preparation (1024-bit) 48 min 8 hr 3.3 days
Veriﬁcation (1024-bit) 72 min 12 hr 5 days
Preparation (2048-bit) 5.1 hr 51 hr 21 days
Veriﬁcation (2048-bit) 7.7 hr 77 hr 32 days
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a new protocol for sealed-bid auctions that guar-
antees trust and preserves a high level of secrecy, yet is practi-
cal enough to run efﬁciently on commodity hardware and be ac-
cepted in the business community. Because we focus on proofs of
correctness and secrecy during the auction, an auctioneer can still
compute optimal results efﬁciently and publish efﬁciently veriﬁ-
able proofs of those results. Our protocol rests on sound crypto-
graphic foundations, and lends itself to straightforward extensions
to further types of auctions, including support for all-or-nothing
bids, bid curves, and full combinatorial auctions; we intend to pur-
sue these extensions in later work, in addition to completing a full
description of tiebreaking and bulk veriﬁcation of test sets. We be-
lieve that our practical test-set model will extend to other areas of
privacy, including electronic transactions, trading systems, privacy-
preserving open outcry markets, and zero-knowledge public veriﬁ-
cation of private data.
7. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was supported in part by an Alfred P. Sloan Founda-
tion Award to Parkes and NSF grant CCR-0205423 to Rabin. The
authors thank Michael Hamburg, Alex Healy, and Adam Juda for
helpful comments and information.
8. REFERENCES
[1] M. Abe and K. Suzuki. M+1-st price auction using
homomorphic encryption. In Proc. Public Key Cryptography,
2002.
[2] V. Afualo and J. McMillan. Auctions of rights to public
property. In P. Newman, editor, The New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics and the Law. Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
[3] O. Baudron and J. Stern. Non-interactive private auctions. In
Proc. Financial Cryptography, 2001.
[4] P. G. Bradford, S. Park, and M. H. Rothkopf. Protocol
completion incentive problems in cryptographic Vickrey
auctions. Technical Report RRR 3-2004, Rutgers Center for
Operations Research (RUTCOR), 2004.
[5] F. Brandt. How to obtain full privacy in auctions. Technical
report, Carnegie Mellon University, 2005.
[6] F. Brandt and T. Sandholm. (Im)possibility of
unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions. In Proc. 3rd Int.
Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems,
pages 810–817, 2004.
[7] M. Burmester, E. Magkos, and V. Chrissikopoulos.
Uncoercible e-bidding games. Electronic Commerce
Research, 4:113–125, 2004.
[8] I. Damg˚ ard and M. Jurik. A generalisation, a simpliﬁcation
and some applications of Paillier’s probabilistic public-key
system. In Proc. Public Key Cryptography 01, 2001.
[9] T. ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature
scheme based on discrete logarithms. IEEE Trans.
Information Theory, IT-31(4):469–472, 1985.
[10] W. J. Elmaghraby. Pricing and auctions in emarketplaces. In
Handbook of Quantitative Supply Chain Analysis: Modeling
in the E-Business Era. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Norwell, MA, 2004.
[11] M. K. Franklin and M. K. Reiter. The design and
implementation of a secure auction server. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 22(5):302–312, 1986.
[12] D. Giry and P. Bulens. Cryptographic key length
recommendation. http://www.keylength.com, 2006.
[13] M. Harkavy, J. D. Tygar, and H. Kikuchi. Electronic auctions
with private bids. In Proc. Third USENIX Workshop on
Electronic Commerce, pages 61–74, 1998.
[14] H. Kikuchi. (m+1)st price auction protocol. In Proc.
Financial Cryptography, 2001.
[15] V. Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002.
[16] M. Kumar and S. I. Feldman. Internet auctions. In Proc. 3rd
USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce, 1998.
[17] LiDIA-Group. LiDIA — a library for computational number
theory. TU Darmstadt, 2001.
[18] H. Lipmaa, N. Asokan, and V. Niemi. Secure Vickrey
auctions without threshold trust. In Proc. 6th International
Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC 2002), pages
87–101, 2002.
[19] D. Lucking-Reiley. Vickrey auctions in practice: From
nineteenth century philately to twenty-ﬁrst century
e-commerce. J. of Economic Perspectives, 14:182–192,
2000.
[20] J. McMillan. Selling spectrum rights. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 8:145–162, 1994.
[21] P. Milgrom. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
[22] M. Naor, B. Pinkas, and R. Sumner. Privacy preserving
auctions and mechanism design. In Proc. First ACM Conf. on
Elec. Commerce, pages 129–139, 1999.
[23] National Institute of Standards and Technology. Secure hash
signature standard.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/
fips/fips180-2/fips180-2withchangenotice.pdf,
2002. FIPS PUB 180-2.
[24] P. Paillier. Cryptographie ` a Cl´ e Publique Bas´ ee sur la
R´ esiduosit´ e de Degr´ e Composite. PhD thesis, ´ Ecole
Nationale Sup´ erieure des T´ el´ ecommunications, 1999.
[25] P. Paillier. Public-key cryptosystems based on composite
residuosity classes. In Proc. EUROCRYPT ’99, pages
223–239, 1999.[26] M. O. Rabin. Digitalized signatures. In Foundations of
Secure Computing, pages 155–166. Academic Press, New
York, 1978.
[27] M. O. Rabin. Digitalized signatures and public-key functions
as intractable as factorization. Technical Report
MIT/LCS/TR-212, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science,
1979.
[28] V. Rijmen and P. S. L. M. Barreto. The Whirlpool hash
function. http://paginas.terra.com.br/
informatica/paulobarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html.
[29] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman. A method for
obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems.
Technical Report MIT/LCS/TM-82, MIT Laboratory for
Computer Science, 1977.
[30] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and D. A. Wagner. Time-lock
puzzles and timed release crypto. Technical Report
MIT/LCS/TR-684, MIT, 1996.
[31] M. H. Rothkopf, T. J. Teisberg, and E. P. Kahn. Why are
Vickrey auctions rare? Journal of Political Economy,
98:94–109, 1990.
[32] T. Sandholm, D. Levine, M. Concordia, P. Martyn,
R. Hughes, J. Jacobes, and D. Begg. Changing the game in
strategic sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive
competition enabled by optimization. Interfaces,
36(1):55–68, 2006.
[33] S. W. Smith. Trusted Computing Platforms: Design and
Applications. Springer, New York, 2005.
[34] S. G. Stubblebine and P. F. Syverson. Fair on-line auctions
without special trusted parties. In Proc. of Financial
Cryptography, 1999.
[35] K. Suzuki and M. Yokoo. Secure generalized Vickrey
auction using homomorphic encryption. In Proc. Financial
Cryptography, 2003.
[36] B. L. Xiaofeng Chen, Kwangjo Kim. Receipt-free electronic
auction schemes using homomorphic encryption. In ICISC,
2003.
[37] M. Yokoo and K. Suzuki. Secure multi-agent dynamic
programming based on homomorphic encryption and its
application to combinatorial auctions. In Proc. First Int.
Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2002.
APPENDIX
A. PAILLIER ENCRYPTION
A.1 Public/Private Keys
Paillier encryption uses an encryption key n = p·q, where p and q
are large primes. The decryption key is based on the factorization
of n, φ = ϕ(n) = (p−1)·(q−1). ϕ(n) is Euler’s totient function,
the number of integers relatively prime to n.
A.2 Encryption
To encrypt a plaintext x, ﬁrst compute a random value r from the
range [1,n−1] such that gcd(r,n) = 1, then recall that (1+n)x ≡
(1+xn) (mod n2) and encrypt as
E(x,r) = (1+xn)·rn (mod n2) (12)
A.3 Decryption
To decrypt C = E(x), given decryption key φ = (p−1)(q−1),
observe that rn·φ ≡ 1 (mod n2) by Euler’s Totient Theorem, and
Cφ = (1+n)x·φrn·φ (mod n2)
= 1+xφn (mod n2)
x =
(Cφ −1)/φ mod n2
n
(13)
We did not use this method when obtaining our results in Section 5.
Instead, we used a more efﬁcient algorithm involving precompu-
tation and Chinese remaindering, as described in Paillier’s Ph.D.
thesis [24].
A.3.1 Decryption with random help value r
It is also possible for some P who knows the r used to encryptC =
E(x,r) to show V that x is the unique decryption of C by revealing
r. P may know r either by having encrypted all the values used to
computeC or by computing it via the decryption key φ. To recover
x, V computes
x =
(C·r−n mod n2)−1
n
(14)
A.3.2 Uniqueness of Encryptions
Paillier encryption constitutes a bijection from (Zn × Z∗
n) →
Z∗
n2 [25].19 Thus any integer in Z∗
n2 represents a single valid en-
cryption of an integer x ∈ Zn with random help value r ∈ Z∗
n. Con-
sequently, if C = E(x,r), C 6= E(x0,r0) for any x0 ∈ Zn and r0 6= r.
P can attempt to cheat by providing a different random help value
r0. Using r0 instead of r in (14) will yield a different but invalid “de-
cryption” x0. V must therefore verify the provided value r0 is con-
sistent with the known encryptionC. This is done by re-encrypting
the derived value x0 asC0 = E(x0,r0) and rejecting r0 unlessC0 =C.
A.4 Mathematical Operations on Encrypted
Values
The following deﬁnitions apply to any values encrypted as above,
such as bids, deposit amounts, or desired quantities. These proper-
ties are due to the homomorphic properties of Paillier’s encryption
scheme [25]. In these deﬁnitions we refer to a prover P who has
the decryption key or all random help values for encrypted data,
(generally the auctioneer), and a veriﬁer V who does not.
Addition. Addition of two encrypted values:
E(x)·E(y) = E(x+y) (mod n2)
Adding a constant k to an encrypted value x is easily done by en-
crypting k with the random help value 1 and multiplying the two
encryptions.
E(x)·(1+kn) = E(x+k) (mod n2)
Multiplication or division by a constant. Division is only possi-
ble when k is invertible mod n2.20
(E(x))k = E(x·k) (mod n2)
(E(x))1/k = E(x/k) (mod n2)
19 Zn: the set of integers [0,n)
Z∗
n: the subset of Zn relatively prime to n
20This is no impediment, as ﬁnding a noninvertible k is tantamount
to breaking the security key.Negation. Implied by multiplication by a constant.
(E(x))−1 = E(−x) (mod n2)
Comparison to a constant k. P can prove any encryption C =
E(k,r) is an encryption of k by revealing the help value r used to
encrypt C. V then veriﬁes that (1+nk)rn =C (mod n2), because
E(k,r) = (1+n)k ·rn (mod n2) (15)
This is of particular interest when k = 0. We remark that no en-
cryption of a value other than zero is an nth residue mod n2.21
Equality comparison. Given two ciphertexts C1 = E(x1,r1) and
C2 = E(x2,r2), P can prove x1 = x2 without revealing any addi-
tional information—most importantly, the value of x1 or x2. Both
P and V compute C0 = C1 ·C−1
2 (mod n2) = E(x1 −x2,r1/r2) =
E(0,r1/r2). P then proves C0 is an encryption of zero as above by
revealing r1/r2.
Inequality comparison. Given two ciphertexts Cx = E(x) and
Cy = E(y), P can show x > y and x ≥ y. Because our values x and
y are integers mod n2, we can prove x > y by showing x ≥ y+1,
provided y 6= n−1. Due to the homomorphic properties of Paillier
encryption, E(x+1) = E(x)·(n+1) (mod n2), and so adding 1 to
a value in its encrypted form is trivial. Thus, all ordering compar-
isons can be reduced to the ability to prove x ≥ y. We ﬁrst spec-
ify that x and y must be in the range [0,2t) for 2t < n/2. This
can be proven as in Section 2.4.6. Then, to prove x ≥ y, both P
and V calculate E(x−y) = E(x)·E(y)−1 (mod n2), and P proves
0 ≤ (x−y) < 2t < n/2 from E(x−y). If in fact x < y, then (x−y)
will wrap around mod n2 so that (x−y) ≥ n/2 and no such proof
is possible. This principle is also described in Section 2.4.6.
Proof of multiplication of two values. Because Paillier encryption
does not enable the secrecy-preserving multiplication of two en-
crypted values as it does addition, we require a method that allows a
prover P with three plaintexts u, v, and w such that uv = w (mod n)
to prove this fact to a veriﬁer V who has Paillier encryptions E(u),
E(v), and E(w), respectively. D˚ amgard et al. [8] propose another
solution to this; the solution we present is in the spirit of our other
cryptographic primitives.
DEFINITION 2. A Multiplication Test Set (MTS) for E(u,r),
E(v,s), and E(w,t) is a set of 8 elements:
{E(u1,r1),E(u2,r2),E(v1,s1),E(v2,s2),
E(wi,j) = E(uivj,pi,j) | i, j ∈ {1,2}}
where u = u1+u2 (mod n) and v = v1+v2 (mod n).
In each MTS, u1 and v1 are chosen uniformly at random from Zn;
u2 and v2 are correspondingly deﬁned, as above, so that u = u1 +
u2 (mod n) and likewise for v.
Clearly, if given encryptions as in MTS and
w1,1+w1,2+w2,1+w2,2 = w (mod n) (16)
then in fact uv = w (mod n). But for P to prove and for V to verify
all the relationships included in the MTS entails revealing u1, u2,
21To say that x is an nth residue (mod m) means that there exists
some value g such that x = gn (mod m). See also Footnote 6.
v1, and v2, consequently revealing u and v. Thus we adopt for an in-
teractive proof the following challenge and partial revelation proof.
P constructs and sends MTS. V randomly chooses a challenge pair
(i, j), say, (1,2), and sends it to P. In this case, P reveals r1, s2,
and p1,2. This allows V to decrypt E(u1), E(v2), and E(w1,2), and
directly verify that u1·v2 ≡ w1,2 (mod n). P further reveals:
R = r1·r2·r−1 (mod n)
S = s1·s2·s−1 (mod n)
p = p1,1· p1,2· p2,1· p2,2·t−1 (mod n)
V by use of R veriﬁes E(u1)·E(u2)·E(u)−1 (mod n2) = E(0,R),
i.e., veriﬁes u = u1+u2 (mod n) and similarly v = v1+v2 (mod n)
via S. Finally, V veriﬁes E(w1,1) · E(w1,2) · E(w2,1) · E(w2,2) ·
t−1 (mod n2) = E(0,p), thereby verifying that (16) holds.
A moment’s thought reveals that if MTS was not proper then the
probability of V uncovering this by the random choice of (i, j) is
at least 1
4. Thus the probability of P meeting the challenge when
uv 6= w (mod n) is at most 3
4. This implies that if m MTS’s are
used and P meets all m random challenges then the probability of
P cheating is smaller than (3
4)m. In practice, the auctioneer will act
as P and verify the multiplications required to prove the validity of
multi-item auction allocations by repeating these zero-knowledge
proofs until the desired likelihood of error is achieved.
B. BULK VERIFICATION OF TEST SETS
We have already shown how AU can use a test set to prove both that
for any encrypted bids E(Bid1) and E(Bid2), {Bid1,Bid2} ≤ 2t
and Bid1 > Bid2, provided 2t < n/2. We also provided a non-
interactive proof to allow the validity of test-sets to be established.
Here, we improve the computational speed of this “cut and choose”
approach for multiple range-of-value proofs by allowing anyone to
verify en masse a whole collection of test sets, to then be used in
proofs of range and ordering of values. Recall that in single-item
auctions with k bidders, AU will verify that k bids are in range,
and then perform k−1 comparisons to prove the correctness of the
auction. These auctions require 2k−1 range-of-value proofs.
Adopting numbers that are appropriate for an auction with 100 bid-
dersandmoderatesecurityrequirements, weassumeforillustration
that the auctioneer employs 10 test sets per proof and ﬁrst creates
and posts 2500 (claimed) test sets. For bulk veriﬁcation we se-
lect and reveal 500 test sets uniformly at random in a collection
of 2500. The probability that all 500 will be correct and 200 (or
more) of the remaining 2000 are incorrect is < 7×10−19. We can
then prove correctness of each bid or comparison with probability
of error < 10−10 by drawing 10 of the remaining 2000 test sets
uniformly at random and proving correctness on each of them. We
can achieve a truly random ordering of the 2500 test sets using the
random data string X as in the main description of our method.